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  Why are modern societies governed by a system of legal punishment and not peer 
punishment?  Economists would argue that in a one-shot cooperative task, peers under-provide 
punishment of free-riders; hence a legal system is required.  We show that an additional reason 
why a legal system is advantageous could be that punishment is an emotional issue.  Emotions 
have often been referenced as an explanation for peer punishment in teams (Fehr and Gaechter, 
1999; Gaechter and Herrmann, 2005; Xiao and Houser, 2005).  While the most common view 
among economists is that emotions simply shape the reward parameters for rational choice 
(Anderson and Putterman, 2006; de Quervain et al., 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), 
psychologists claim that emotions may affect the ability to make rational choices within those 
parameters (Elster, 1998).  We suggest that emotions may interfere with strategic reasoning, 
which provides an additional rationale for why in many situations judicial enforcement is 
preferred to peer punishment. We put forward and test alternative specifications regarding the 
role of emotions. 
For legal systems, the main goal is how much a criminal is getting punished (Becker, 
1968).  This paper presents an experimental study which shows that peer punishment is largely 
insensitive to the cumulation of sanctions and is instead motivated by the satisfaction of 
personally punishing a subject.  Punishment of free-riders may make the punisher feel better off 
but may have tenuous relations with the rationale of legal punishment systems.  Situations may 
even exist where peers over-provide punishment. 
The concepts of strategic and emotional punishment are introduced in section 2 and a 
more formal model is presented in section 4.  The two novel experimental designs used to 
disentangle the alternative models are outlined in section 3.  In the first design, strategic 
  1reasoning in punishment plays no role (one-to-one treatment) and this serves as a benchmark for 
the individual taste for punishment.  The second design measures how people respond when 
strategic reasoning is involved (sequential treatment).  The results are reported in section 5 and 
the conclusions follow in section 6. 
 
2. Strategic Reasoning in Punishment 
Consider a group of three people where agents 1 and 2 want to punish agent 3 (the target). 
Assume that agent 1 has a quasi-linear utility function, u1 = π1 + v1 (p13, p23), which is strictly 
increasing in personal monetary earnings π1 and weakly increasing (and concave) in the 
punishment points inflicted on the target by either herself, p13, or agent 2, p23.  Agent 2 has a 
similar utility function. 
In our one-to-one treatment, only agent 1 can punish agent 3.  Hence, agent 1 decides on 
her punishment request p13 knowing that nobody except her has the opportunity to punish agent 
3.  She will have to balance her personal cost to punish (– p13) versus the benefit of having agent 
3 punished (v1 (p13, 0) – v1 (0, 0)).  We define agent 1’s optimal choice in the one-to-one 
treatment as her standalone punishment, s13=s, which gives us a measure of the agent’s taste for 
punishment absent any strategic consideration.    
The most common design in the literature allows for simultaneous punishments from 
agent 1 and agent 2, which are then cumulated to reduce agent 3’s earnings.  Because of strategic 
considerations, agent 1’s optimal choice could now be to punish anywhere between zero and her 
standalone punishment level, (∂v1/∂p13=∂v1/∂p23).  Consider the standard assumption that agent 1 
cares only about the fact that, as a consequence of everyone’s actions, agent 3 receives a certain 
level of punishment.  Hence, her marginal utility from punishment is identical whether she or 
  2agent 2 is doing the punishment (v1 (s, 0) = v1 (0, s)).  For instance, if agent 2 already requests s 
points of punishment, agent 1’s best response is to punish zero.  This assumption formalizes the 
concept of punishment as a second-order public good.  Agents care about the free-rider getting 
punished but dislike having to pay the cost.  Unfortunately, when agent 1 and 2 have an identical 
taste for punishment (s13=s23=s) and choices are simultaneous, any combination of punishment 
requests that sum up to s is an equilibrium (Varian, 1994).  A coordination problem arises given 
this multiplicity of equilibria, which makes the interpretation of empirical evidence ambiguous. 
In order to study strategic behavior in punishment with the convenience of a unique 
equilibrium, we introduce a sequential treatment.  Suppose that first, agent 1 decides on her 
punishment request for agent 3 and then, after learning agent 1’s choice, agent 2 decides how 
many additional points to give.  If both agents have an identical taste for punishment, there exists 
a unique equilibrium where agent 1 punishes zero and agent 2 requests s points (p13=0, p23=s, 
point R in Figure 1).
1  Being the first to move puts agent 1 in a position to free-ride on the cost of 
punishment while enjoying a punishment equal to her standalone punishment level.  In fact, any 
reduction in punishment by agent 1 will be exactly offset by an equivalent increase in 
punishment by agent 2. 
If punishment is strategic, a one-to-one treatment should yield substantially different 
patterns of punishment than a sequential treatment.  As reported in section 5, the data largely  
refutes this prediction.  Punishment is not treated as a second-order public good.  To explain the 
data, we introduce a model of emotional punishment.  Agents engage in emotional punishment 
when their utility from punishment is derived from personally inflicting the punishment.  While 
the identity of the punisher is irrelevant for a strategic punisher, this is not the case for an 
                                                 
1 We thank Steve Gjerstad for suggestions on Figure 1. More details on the emotional and strategic models are 
provided in section 4. 
  3emotional punisher.  If agent 1 is an emotional punisher, agent 2’s punishment of agent 3 has no 
impact on agent 1’s utility (v1 (s, 0) > v1 (0, s) = v1 (0, 0)).
2  The emotional model predicts the 
same amount of punishment in the one-to-one, simultaneous, and sequential treatments (point E 
in Figure 1).  Moreover, as group size grows, it predicts in expectation a linear increase in overall 
punishment. 
 
3. The Experimental Design 
Our design consists of a public good experiment with three treatments within each 
session.  There are N=15 participants in each session.  In every period, the participants are 
randomly partitioned into five groups of n=3 individuals.  In all treatments, subjects participate 
for twenty-four periods in a finitely repeated public good game with and without punishment 
opportunities.  In the first four periods, there is no punishment opportunity while in the last 
twenty periods there is.  Punishment opportunities are structured in two different ways: ten 
periods of “one-to-one” and ten periods of “sequential” punishment. Experimental instructions 
are in the Appendix. 
The voluntary contribution to the public good has the standard linear structure.  Every 
period, each of the n subjects in a group receives an endowment of y=20 tokens and makes a 
simultaneous decision to either keep these tokens for oneself or contribute gi tokens (0 ≤ gi ≤ y) 






j i i g a g y
1
1 π        ( 1 )  
where a is the marginal per capita return from a contribution to the public good,   a=0.6.   
                                                 
2 Elster (1998, p.69) provides an example of the opposite emotional preferences: an envious person generally prefers 
a third person to make her rival worse off than doing it herself. 
  4            In the one-to-one punishment treatment, once group members are informed about each 
member’s contribution to the public good, each subject simultaneously submits two punishment 
requests.  At a private cost of one token per punishment point, a subject can decrease the 
earnings of one other individual in her group by four tokens.  Let us designate group members 
with the letters A, B, and C.  While group member A submits one punishment request for 
member B and one for C, one request is going to be carried out and the other is ignored.  We toss 
a coin and when the outcome is “heads”, individual A’s target is B, B’s target is C, and C’s target 
is A.  When “tails”, individual A’s target is C, B’s target is A, and C’s target is B.  Hence, each 
individual has the opportunity to punish exactly one other group member and every group 
member can be punished by just one other individual. 
In the sequential treatment, once group members are informed about each member’s 
contribution to the public good, each subject submits two punishment requests sequentially. 
There are two steps in the sequence, which will be explained through an example.  In step one, 
subject A decides on the punishment of B.  In addition, A makes a forecast about how many 
additional points of punishment B will receive in step two from C.  This last prediction carries 
no payoff consequences.  In step two, A decides on the punishment of C.  Before her step two 
decision, A learns how many points were assigned in step one to C.  The order of the sequence is 
random.  In each period, every subject submits two punishment requests and both will be 
executed.  Punishment points received from the two group members cumulate.  Punishment 
points can be added but never subtracted.  
In all punishment conditions, subject i can punish any group member j by requesting 
punishment points, p
k
i ∈{0,1,…,10}.  For each punishment point assigned to j, the first–stage 
payoff of j,  , is reduced by four tokens.  In the sequential treatment, all the (n-1) punishment  1
j π
  5requests received cumulate and group member j’s payoff is reduced by  , where 
e(p)= 4 p is the effectiveness of punishment function.  For subject i there is a cost to request 














i is the cost of punishment.  In the 
sequential treatment, the monetary payoff for subject i from both stages,  , can be written as:  i π




k i i p c p e 1 π π      (2) 
In the one-to-one treatment, only one punishment request is selected to be actually carried out. 
For received punishment points, subject i’s payoff is reduced by  , where k(i) is the 
punishment request of the group member randomly assigned to subject i.  For punishment points 
given to others, subject i’s payoff is reduced by  .
) ( ) (
i
i k p e
) ( ) (i k
i p c   The total payoff for a session is the 
sum of the period–payoffs for all twenty-four periods.
The experiment is conducted on computers using  the “z-Tree” program (Fischbacher, 1998) 
with subjects anonymously interacting with each other. No subject is ever informed of the 
identity of the other group members.  No communication among subjects is allowed.  At the 
beginning of a session, subjects are informed that the experiment has three parts and the 
instructions for part one are read.  When part one of the experiment is completed, instructions for 
part two are read, and so on. Each punishment condition was preceded by a trial period to 
familiarize the subjects with the software. The payoff function, parameter values of y, n, N, a and 
the protocol of the punishment requests are common knowledge.  At the end of each period, 
subjects in each group are informed both about the total and individual contributions to the 
project in their group. 
  6To prevent the possibility of individual reputation formation across periods, each 
subject’s own contribution is always listed in the first column of his or her computer screen and 
the remaining two subjects’ contributions are listed without subject ID in the other two columns. 
Subjects know their own punishment activities, the aggregate punishments imposed on them by 
the other group members, and the aggregate punishment imposed on other group members. 
 
4. Predictions 
        We outline the predictions of three alternative models: canonical, emotional and 
strategic.  All predictions are made for a one-shot interaction where agents’ preferences are 
common knowledge.  The three models differ only in the utility from punishment, vi:  
•  Canonical,         ui = πi  
•  Emotional punishment,   ui = πi + vi (p
j
i;  g1, g2,..., gn)  




-i;  g1, g2,..., gn)               
Agent i's utility is quasi-linear in her monetary payoffs πi (see equation 2) and is increasing and 
concave in the points of punishment given to agent j, vi′(p
j




             The canonical predictions for the experimental treatments of section 3 are well known.  
Group payoff   is maximized if each group member fully cooperates (g ∑ =
n
i i 1
1 π i = y) but full 
free–riding (gi = 0) is a dominant strategy in the contribution game.  This follows from 
= – 1 + a < 0 in (1).  In equilibrium, subjects will contribute nothing to the public good 
and will not punish others, either in the sequential or in the one-to-one treatments.  In fact, 
i i g ∂ ∂ / 1 π
                                                 
3 A more complete model is ui = πi + vi (p13, p23, p12, p32, p21, p31). In the experimental design, revenge was not 
possible because the information about the punishment received by the subject was revealed only at the end of a 
period. For instance, agent 1 could not condition her punishment strategy on p21 or p31. The adopted specification 
still rules out some more complex strategies. For instance, the possibility that agent 1’s punishment strategy is 
conditional on p32. 
  7choosing p
j
i>0 is a monetary cost that does not generate any monetary benefit in a one-shot 
interaction.  
The models of emotional and strategic punishment are not new specifications of other-
regarding preferences.  Rather, each represents a class of other-regarding utility functions.  A 
basic difference between the two is that for an emotional agent i what matters is only the 
punishment that she personally carries out, pi, while a strategic agent i values the punishment she 
gives and the punishment that others give, p-i  equally.  Except for some examples of vi, general 
equilibrium predictions for the contribution and punishment game have not been worked out.  In 
order to focus on the punishment decision without committing to a specific model of other-
regardness, this section carries out only a partial equilibrium analysis.  The agents have 
completed the contribution stage, know the results and face the decision about how many 
punishment points to give in the second stage.  
   For an emotional agent i, one can measure her taste for punishment through :  j
i p ˆ





i p u p
j
i
, max arg ˆ
10 ,..., 1 , 0
π
∈
=     (3) 
Given a contribution profile g -i={g1, …, gi-1, gi+1,..., gn},   is the optimal number of  points of 
punishment for agent i to give to agent j.  We say that agent i has a higher taste for punishment 






i p p ˆ ˆ >
4  The cost of punishment is linear, ci=c ⋅ p
j
i.  An emotional 
punisher will respond to a higher cost of punishment c by lowering  .  This “price effect” of  j
i p ˆ
                                                 
4   can be zero. Note that the function v j
i p ˆ i can vary for a different target agent j, a different vector of first-stage 
contributions (g1, ..., gn), and a different effectiveness function e(p
j
i), which sets the fine-to-fee ratio. This definition, 
like all the discussion in this Section, is done in reference to a generic target agent j and not to the whole group. For 
this reason, we will sometimes drop the j subscript from expressions without fear of confusion. 
  8punishment is documented by several experimental studies (Carpenter, 2006; Andreoni et al., 
2003; Putterman and Anderson, 2006).  
Predictions for emotional punishment.  As others’ punishment choices do not impact the utility 
of an emotional agent, in each treatment there exists (trivially) a unique equilibrium where, given 
a contribution profile (gi , g-i), 
1)  Agent i will request the same punishment level  in both treatments.  j
i p ˆ
2)  In the sequential treatment, the expected aggregate levels of punishment in step one and 
step two are identical. 
3)  In the sequential treatment, the overall punishment received by agent j is the sum of each 
agent’s  , P j
i p ˆ




i p 1 ˆ
4)  In the one-to-one treatment, the expected overall punishment received by agent j is the 
average of each agent’s  , E[P j
i p ˆ




i p 1 ˆ
Similarly, in the strategic model one can measure agent i‘s taste for punishment through
j
i p : 
 
{} ( { ) }
0,1,...,10








=      (4) 
Notice that for a strategic agent, the optimal number of points of punishment to give to agent j in 
general depends on how many points of punishment the others will give, p
j
-i.  With a slight abuse 
of notation, we will simply use  i p  instead of 
j
i p .  The measure  i p defines the standalone 
punishment level for the case when nobody else punishes, p
j
-i =0.  While the punishment choice 
of the emotional agent is always , the optimal punishment choice of the strategic agent 
depends on the expected punishment of others and her standalone punishment level
j
i p ˆ
i p  is the 
  9upper bound.  The one-to-one treatment is a special case where p
j
-i =0 by design and hence  i p is 
the optimal choice for the strategic punisher. 
For a strategic punisher, the essential issue is the total impact on agent j, and – unlike 
emotional punishers – she has no objections to others doing the “dirty job” of punishing.  She 
actually prefers it because it saves her the punishment cost.  This framework was adapted from 
the model that Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Varian (1994) developed for voluntary public good 
contributions.   
Predictions for strategic punishment.  In each treatment, there exists a unique equilibrium 
where, given a contribution profile (gi , g-i), 
1)  In the one-to-one treatment agent i punishes at her standalone punishment level, 
j
i p .  
2)  In the sequential treatment, the cost of punishment falls disproportionately on the 
punisher who moves in step two. 
3)  In the sequential treatment, in a given period only one agent carries out the punishment 
on agent j. 
4)  In the sequential treatment, the overall punishment received by agent j is less than or 
equal to the maximum of all agents’ standalone punishment levels, P
SS≤ max i {
j
i p }.  
5)  In the one-to-one treatment, the expected overall punishment received by agent j is the 





i p 1 /n.   
We discuss predictions 2 and 3 using a group of n=3 members where agent 1 is moving in step 
one and agent 2 in step two.  When just one agent has a positive standalone punishment level, 
prediction 3 is trivial.  Moreover, given that the probability of moving in step one is one half, 
punishment will be equally distributed between the two steps.  Suppose instead that two agents 
  10want to punish agent 3,  k p > 0 for k=1,2.  If agent 1 does not punish, then agent 2 will choose to 
punish  2 p  points.  In equilibrium, agent 1 should not punish agent 3 at all unless her standalone 
punishment level is much higher than agent 2‘s.  In the latter case, agent 2 will not punish.  More 
formally, the best reply of agent 1 can be derived from his indirect utility function (Figure 1): 
u1 = π1 + v 1 (p1 + B2(p1))    (5) 
u1 = π1 + v 1 (p1 + max{( 2 p –p1),  0})    (6) 
Let us consider the three possible cases.  When agent 2 has the highest preference to punish, 
2 p > 1 p , the optimal strategy for agent 1 is to choose zero punishment.  When preferences are 
identical,  2 1 p p = , agent 1 chooses zero points of punishment for agent 3, knowing that the best 
response of agent 2  is to choose  2 p .  In equilibrium, agent 2 bears all the cost of punishing.  
The order of moves solves the coordination problem that exists when choices are simultaneous. 
When agent 2 has the lowest preference to punish, agent 1’s optimal strategy is to punish for the 
whole amount  1 p  only if he likes to punish much more than agent 2 and to punish zero therwise. 
That happens when u1(π1, 0,  2 p ) < u1(π1- 1 p ,  1 p , 0), which reduces to ∆1 > 1 p where ∆1= v1( 1 p ) 
–v1( 2 p ).
5  
           Consider an example with the following utility function: 
ui  =  πi  + αi ln(pi + p-i),              with αi  >0    (7) 
The preference for punishment vi is increasing and concave, v′=αi/(pi + p-i) >0 and v′′= –αi/(pi + 
p-i)
2 <0.  The standalone punishment level is i p =αi.  The best reply function is Bi(p-i)=max{0, αi 
                                                 
5 The intuition behind this strategy is that agent 1 chooses between not punishing, hence getting the preferred 
punishment level of agent 2, and fully paying for his preferred level of punishment, which is higher. He will punish 
if the additional utility of the higher punishment is worth the cost. On the other hand, when preferences are similar, 
∆1 < 1 p , the optimal strategy is zero punishment as in the case of identical preferences.  
  11–p-i}.  The indirect utility function of agent 1 is u1 = π1  + α1 ln(p1 + max{0, α2 – p1}).  In 
general, agent 1 punishes if ln(α1/α2) >1.  For instance, when  α1=4 and α2 =2, agent 1’s best 
response is not to punish; when α1=6 and α2 =2 the best response is to punish. 
 
5. Results 
A total of 90 subjects were recruited among the undergraduate student population of the 
University of Siena via ads posted around campus.  No subject had participated in public good 
experiments before.  Six sessions were conducted in May 2005.  In half of the sessions, the 
sequential treatment was part two and in the other half it was part three.  Including the reading of 
instructions, each session lasted about 2 hours.  Payment was done privately in cash at the end of 
each session and was $13.90 (11 euros) per subject on average.  There are four main results. 
 
Result 1: In the sequential treatment, the patterns of punishment are not explained by strategic 
behavior.  In particular, the data do not support the prediction of a relatively higher punishment 
in step two than in step one.   Average punishment in step one was 10% higher than in step two.  
 
Figure 2 shows that a contribution action in step one received on average 1.36 points of 
punishment compared with 1.24 points in step two. If subjects were strategic, step one 
punishment would be considerably lower than step two punishment. Previous studies carried out 
in an explicit context of sequential provision of a public good report that subjects do understand 
these strategic implications and dramatically reduce their contribution when choosing in step one 
(Harrison and Hirshleifer, 1989, SQ-1 treatment). The punishment choices reported in this study, 
instead, exhibit a different pattern. 
  12           We build a quantitative prediction of strategic punishment using one-to-one treatment 
data.  This benchmark seems reasonable given that the underlying contribution patterns are 
similar between the two treatments (Figure 3).
6   The simulation relies on two assumptions; first, 
subject 1’s utility is u1 = π1 + α1 ln (p13 + E[p23]); second, the expectation about step two 
punishment E[p23] is estimated with a regression on information concerning the actual 
contribution of the target subject in relation to others in her group, period dummies, and session 
dummies.
7  Simulation 1 is introduced for illustrative purposes and relies on somewhat 
subjective assumptions but provides nevertheless a relevant benchmark. The simulation yields a 
strategic reduction of punishment in step one as shown by Simulation 1 in Figure 2.  In 
particular, for every point of punishment in step two, there are just 0.35 points of punishment in 
step one. The experimental results are instead closer to the predictions of the emotional model of 
equal punishment between steps.
8
 
Result 2. Using one-to-one treatment data, one can rank subjects from light to heavy punishers. 
When the sequential treatment is introduced, there is no systematic change in punishment levels 
among subjects as classified by rankings.  In particular – and contrary to strategic behavior – on 
average, light and medium punishers do not scale back punishment in step one.  
 
                                                 
6 Using a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, one cannot reject that the distribution of group contributions by 
period in sequential and one-to-one treatments are different (0.05 level, N=60, 15 equally-spaced intervals). 
7  OLS individual random effects regression on one-to-one treatment only; regressors included the average 
contribution of the other two persons in own group, deviation of own contribution from group average (one variable 
for positive and one for negative deviation) five session dummies, nine period dummies, dummy for contributions 
above 15 tokens. 
8 Similar punishment across steps is found also by Casari and Luini (2005) for sequential punishment within a group 
of five agents. A drawback of Casari and Luini (2005) is that with n=5, a strategic punisher needs 3 steps of 
reasoning to compute the equilibrium. In the present study (n=3), only one step is required. 
  13In both emotional and strategic models, the one-to-one treatment reveals individual taste for 
punishment.  We can rank subjects in each session based on their average taste for punishment. 
Figure 4 illustrates the punishment requested by the ranking of the subject within each session 
(thick line).  Punishers 1-5 (light punishers) are on average responsible for 11.1% of the 
requested punishment in their session, while punishers 11-15 (heavy punishers) are responsible 
for 54.3% of the requested punishment.  Using the above ranking, we computed individual 
shares of step one punishment in the sequential treatment.  The strategic prediction from 
Simulation 1 is that step one punishment shares should go down for light punishers and go up for 
heavy punishers.  That is clearly shown by the dashed line in Figure 4.  On the contrary, the 
actual distribution of step one punishment is very similar to one-to-one punishment.  Using a 
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, one can reject that step one punishment is equal to 
simulation 1 while one cannot reject the emotional model hypothesis that curves for sequential 
and one-to-one treatments are identical (0.05 level, N=90, 15 equally-spaced intervals). 
We draw similar conclusions when data are disaggregated by subject.  Figure 5 plots the 
average subject punishment in step one versus step two.  When a subject made the same average 
choice between the two steps, she would be represented as a dot on the 45 degree line.  Most 
choices are clustered around the 45 degree line.  Strategic behavior implies that, on average, light 
punishers should punish more in step two and heavy punishers may be punishing less in step 
two.  As Simulation 1 in Figure 6 shows, strategic reasoning should bring a dramatic shift away 
from the 45 degree line.  Simulation 2 is also reported as an alternative benchmark.  In 
Simulation 2, we employ one-to-one treatment data and the same assumption on subject 1’s 
utility, u1 = π1 + α1 ln (p13 + p23).  Now subjects are assumed to have a myopia that induces them 
to behave as if there were no punishment in step two, E[p23]=0.  Hence, the step one punishment 
  14choice would be the standalone punishment level p13=α1.  In step two, agent 2 adds p23=α2 -α1 
points if she has a higher taste for punishment, i.e. if α2 -α1>0, and zero points otherwise.  In 
Simulation 2, there is no strategic reasoning (zero-step) and most of the punishment takes place 
in step one.  For every point of punishment in step two, there are 1.70 points of punishment in 
step one (Figure 2).  One can think of Simulation 2 as agents in step one being temporally 
blinded by emotion after the results. Neither Simulation 1 nor Simulation 2 captures the 
experimental results at an individual level. 
 
Result 3. Contrary to strategic reasoning, in step one often it is the case that subjects do punish 
when they expect the other in step two to add to their punishment.  Excluding trivial cases where 
no punishment is given in step one nor expected in step two, about half of the decisions involve 
positive step one punishment coupled with expectation of additional step two punishment by 
someone else. 
 
Result 3 is based on analysis at the level of single choices, which provide the most direct 
evidence on the extent (or lack) of strategic behavior in punishment.  Table 1 classifies each step 
one punishment choice into five cases depending on how much additional punishment is 
expected on the same target in step two.  If no punishment is given nor expected, the situation is 
trivial and classified as case one.  Of the remaining cases, three are compatible with both 
strategic and emotional punishment (2, 3, 4) and one directly contradicts strategic punishment 
(5).  If a subject punishes in step one while expecting another subject to top it in step two (5), she 
could save on costs by letting the step two punisher do it all and choosing zero.  Case 5 is 
  15evidence of non-strategic behavior and it amounts to half of the non-trivial cases.
9  All five cases 
are compatible with the emotional model of punishment. 
This direct contradiction of strategic punishment relies on the credibility of the elicited 
expectation about step two punishment.  Subjects received no additional compensation for 
accurate estimates.  Still, the distribution of step two estimates is remarkably similar to the 
received step two punishment (Figure 7), and estimates have a robust, positive correlation with 
received step two punishment (Table 2). 
 
Result 4. The joint punishment of the same target in step one and step two cannot be explained 
by reciprocal behavior in punishment. 
 
Evidence for Result 4 comes from the comparison of step one and step two punishments.  A 
reciprocal response involves a “less-than-usual” step two punishment when step one punishment 
is not “adequate” and a “more-than-usual” step two punishment otherwise.  Figure 8 shows the 
empirical evidence when the benchmark for “usual” punishment is taken from the one-to-one 
treatment.  The benchmark informs of the frequency of punishment in both steps that is simply 
due to similarity of punishment norms among subjects.  We conjecture that in the reciprocal 
model, zero points of punishment would be considered inadequate more often than other choices 
and hence elicit a less-than-usual response.  Little evidence emerges from Figure 8, which 
measures the corresponding fraction of step two choices with zero punishment.  The line for the 
sequential treatment is not “steeper” than the one-to-one treatment but roughly parallel. 
 
                                                 
9 It is a lower bound to the amount of violations of strategic punishment. 
  166. Conclusions 
Emotions can both shape the utility function in a similar way to material rewards as well 
as prevent people from thinking clearly about the consequence of an action (Elster, 1998). We 
use an experiment on peer punishment to illustrate this point.  One major result is that most 
subjects fail to reason strategically when deciding on punishment.  
Cooperation among strangers is often possible because those who free ride on the 
cooperation of others are punished.  Several experimental studies have shown that punishers are 
willing to bear the cost of punishing the free-riders.  In a one-shot interaction, peer punishment 
could make the group better off, although it yields punishers no personal material benefits (Falk 
et al., 2005, Page et al., 2005, Sefton et al., 2002). 
For this reason, punishment of free-riders is generally seen as a second-order public good 
(Ostrom et al., 1992; Denant-Boemont et al., 2005) which is provided in modern societies 
through legal punishment systems.  One could conjecture that the human tendency to punish 
free-riders may enable teams, and societies more generally, to govern themselves without the 
need of legal punishment systems. We find that the performance of peer punishment can be 
fundamentally compromised because punishers do not treat peer punishment as a second-order 
public good.  Subjects take satisfaction from the personal action of punishing, not from rationally 
providing incentives for the free-rider to contribute.  We conclude that the violation of a norm 
clouds the ability of subjects to think strategically in their punishment decisions.  Hence, legal 
institutions have at least two advantages over peer punishment.  First, they aim at deterring free-
riding through an overall sanction proportional to the crime.  Second, they follow strict formal 
procedures in an attempt to isolate punishment decisions from emotional responses to the crime. 
  17There is a generic agreement in the literature that emotions play an important role in peer 
punishment.  A novel aspect of this paper is to put forward specific models that incorporate 
emotions into the utility from punishment and to test them empirically.  The model of strategic 
punishment takes the standard view that agents care only about the consequence of their actions.  
The model of emotional punishment, instead, assumes that what provides utility is the personal 
act of punishing.  We present results about peer punishment from two novel experimental 
designs, a one-to-one and a sequential treatment.  In the one-to-one treatment, there is no 
strategic element to punishment and predictions are identical for both types of agents.  While the 
emotional model predicts no differences in punishment between the one-to-one and the 
sequential treatment, the strategic model predicts distinct patterns.  More precisely, it makes 
predictions about the timing, magnitude, and identity of the punishment choices.  None of the 
predictions of the strategic model find support in the data.  We introduce two additional variants 
of the strategic model to include the possibility of zero-steps of reasoning and of reciprocation in 
punishment behavior.  Neither variant is capable of explaining the majority of the evidence.  We 
conclude that the model of emotional punishment is a better explanation for the data.  When 
punishment is emotional, large groups may be better off by having alternative, less destructive 
channels to express emotions (Xiao and Houser, 2005) or by appropriately restraining peer 
punishment (Casari and Plott, 2003). In important ways, peer punishment is not guided by the 
aim of deterring crime but instead by the personal satisfaction of taking revenge.  
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1 0  0  No punishment done nor expected 
 
277 31% 
2 +  0  Either the subject is the only one wanting to 
punish   
OR is a heavy punisher who jumps in step 1 
 
116 13% 
3 0  +  Either the subject will not punish in any case  
OR let the other do the punishment for her 
 
156 17% 
4 ++  ++  The expected sum is greater than 10;  
The subject needs the cooperation of the other 
to reach desired level of punishment 
 
41 5% 
5 +  +  The expected sum is less than or equal to 10;  
The subject punishes knowing that the other 
will punish as well 
310 34% 
     Totals  900 100% 
 
Notes: Cases 2, 3, 4, 5 are labeled as “non-trivial.”  Table 2: Relation between predictions and punishment in step two   
  
Dependent variable:  (1) (2) (3) 

















     
Constant 0.1596  0.1432  -0.3555** 
 (0.4667)  (0.3015)  (0.1695) 
Observations 900  900  900 
 
Notes: Tobit regression; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Standard errors 

























Notes: p1 and p2 are the number of punishment points given to agent 3 by agent 1 and 2, respectively.  s is 
the standalone punishment level of agent 1 and 2.  When agent 1 is a strategic punisher and moves in step 
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All requests in the one-to-one treatment
Step 1 of sequential treatment
Step 1 (Simulation 1 - strategic reasoning)
 
 
Notes: The vertical axis reports shares of total punishment in a session; the figure reports averages of all 




















































Note: Sequential treatment data. The solid line is the 45 degree line; the dotted line indicates one standard 
deviation of the individual (step one  – step two) difference.  
 









































































Actual step 2 punishment
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STEP 2 IN SEQUENTIAL TREATMENT
ONE-TO-ONE TREATMENT
STEP 2 IN SIMULATION 1
 
otes: The one-to-one treatment line is computed as the average of two scenarios.  One is when the first 
 
N
request is considered step one  punishment while the other is when the second request is considered step 
one punishment. Instructions (translation from Italian) 
   You are now taking part in an economic experiment on decision-making. If you read the following 
instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. During 
the experiment, your earnings will be calculated in “tokens.” Your earnings depend on your decisions and 
the decisions of other people. At the end of the experiment, the tokens you have earned will be converted 
into Euros at the rate of 
1 token  = 2 euro cents. 
To the cumulative amount you must add 3 Euros as a participation fee. At the end of the experiment your 
earnings will be privately paid in cash. 
   During the experiment, you will not be asked to reveal your identity and your name will not be associated 
with the decisions you are going to make. Moreover, you are not allowed to talk or otherwise communicate 
with the other participants during the experiment. Please turn off you cell phones now. 
 This experiment is divided into three parts. The following instructions are related to the first part 
 
INSTRUCTIONS PART ONE 
   The first part is composed of 4 periods. In each period, you interact with two other persons. The 
experiment participants will be randomly re–matched after each period and therefore it is highly likely that 
in each period you will interact with different people. Nobody knows the identity of the people with whom 
you interact. 
   At the beginning of each period, each participant receives 20 tokens. You task is deciding how you would 
like to use these tokens. The other participants will simultaneously face the same scenario. You have to 
decide how many tokens out of the 20 available you want to contribute to a project and how many not to 
contribute.  
   Each token that you do not contribute to the project increases your earnings by its face value. The tokens 
that you have contributed to the project plus the points that all the other two persons have contributed are 
increased by eighty percent. The resulting total amount is then divided in equal shares among the three 
people. Therefore, you will receive one third of the tokens in the project after the eighty percent increment. 
To sum up, your earnings consist of two parts: 
 
Your earnings this period =  tokens not contributed     +   earnings from the project 
=  (20 – your contribution)    +   
1/3  x ((sum of yours’ and other       
two people’s  contribution    
to the project) x 1.8 ) 
 
   Each of the other two people will receive from the project the same amount that you will. For example, 
consider a situation where the sum of the overall contributions of the three people is 5 tokens. In this case, 
each person receives from the project (5x1.8)/3=3 tokens. Instead, if the total contribution to the project is 
45 tokens, each of the three people receives  (45x1.8)/3=27 tokens. The following table gives you some 
examples of earnings from the project: 
 
Sum of the tokens contributed   0 10 20 30  40  50  60
Earnings from the project for each of the 3 persons   0 6 12 18  24  30  36
 
   For each token that you do not contribute, you earn 1 token. If you contribute this token to the project 
instead, then the total contribution to the project would rise by one token. Your earnings rise by 
1x1.8/3=0.6 tokens. Your contribution to the project would also raise the earnings of other people. More 
precisely, the other two people will earn an additional 0.6 tokens each, so that the overall earnings increase 
for you and the others would be of 1.8 tokens. 
   After everybody has completed his or her decision, you will learn your period earnings. As you can see 
from the screen below, you will also learn the number of tokens contributed to the project by each one of 
the two people that could contribute with you as well as their period earnings. Your final earnings are the 
sum of the earnings from each period. The identity of the other people changes randomly from one period 
to the next. 
This procedure will be repeated 4 periods. 
  
 
In the input screen you can press the “Show previous decisions” button and you will see a table with your 
choices and the choices of the others in previous periods. 
    Please record period by period on paper the decision you input into the computer. 
Are there any questions? 
    If you have questions during the experiment, we kindly ask you to raise your hand and somebody will 
assist you in private. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS PART TWO 
   These are the instructions for the second part of the experiment. The second part consists of 10 periods 
and, as before, in each period you have to make a decision about the use of 20 tokens. 
  In this part of the experiment, each period is composed of two phases. Phase one is identical to the 
procedure already described, while in phase two you can choose whether and how much to reduce the 
earnings of other people that have benefited from the same project. 
   In phase one you have 20 tokens. You task is deciding how you would like to use these tokens. The other 
participants will simultaneously face the same scenario. You have to decide how many tokens out of the 20 
available you want to contribute to a project and how many not to contribute.  
   Each token that you do not contribute to the project increases your earnings by its face value. The tokens 
that you have contributed to the project plus the points that all the other two persons have contributed are 
increased by eighty percent. The resulting total amount is then divided into equal shares among the three 
people. Therefore, you will receive one third of the tokens in the project after the eighty percent increment. 
To sum up, your earnings consist of two parts: 
 
Your earnings in phase one  =  tokens not contributed     +   earnings from the project 
=  (20 – your contribution)    +   
1/3  x ((sum of yours’ and other       
two people’s  contribution    
to the project) x 1.8 ) 
 
   For each token that you do not contribute, you earn 1 token. If you contribute this token to the project 
instead, then the total contribution to the project would rise by one token. Your earnings rise by 
1x1.8/3=0.6 tokens. Your contribution to the project would also raise the earnings of other people. More precisely, the other two people will earn an additional 0.6 tokens each, so that the overall earnings increase 
for you and the others would be of 1.8 tokens. 
   After everybody has completed his or her decision, you will learn your phase one earnings. You will 
learn also the number of tokens contributed to the project by each one of the two people that could 
contribute with you as well as their period earnings.  
In phase two of a period you can reduce or leave equal the earnings of each of the two people that have 
benefited from the same project.  
 
   Your decision is about distributing points. Every point you distribute reduces the earnings of a person by 
4 (four) tokens. For the person that distributes it, every point has a cost of 1 token. You can distribute 
points separately to each of the other two people. If you do not wish to change the earnings of a specific 
person, you can choose 0. If you wish to reduce the earnings of a specific person, you can distribute to her a 
number of points from 0 through 10. You know only the decision made in phase one by the other people. 
There is no way for you to know either the identity or previous choices of the others. 




Of the two requests to distribute points, just one will be actually implemented while the other will be 
ignored. This selection is made by the computer through a coin flip (random selection with probability 
50%). When you make your choice you do not know which one of the two decisions will be selected. 
Let us call the three persons ALPHA, BETA, and GAMMA. Suppose you are ALPHA and have distributed 
2 points to BETA and 3 points to GAMMA. Just one of the following results will be carried out. With 
probability 50%, BETA’s earnings will be reduced by 8 tokens (2x4) and GAMMA’s earnings will not 
change. With probability 50% BETA’s earnings will not change while GAMMA’s earnings will be reduced 
by 12 tokens (3x4), (see figure below). 
 
TWO DECISIONS  
  ALPHA                                         BETA 
  
 
                                  GAMMA                                
ONE OF THE FOLLOWING RESULTS                             
              50%    (random selection)                                         50%    (random selection) 
 
ALPHA                                              BETA                 ALPHA                                   BETA 
  
 
                          GAMMA                                                                                 GAMMA 
 
 
   In phase two, everyone could receive points but from only one other person. If you have the 
opportunity to distribute points to BETA, nobody else will have that opportunity. If you have the 
opportunity to distribute points to GAMMA, nobody else will have that opportunity. In other words, if you 
do not distribute her points, nobody will have the opportunity to do it. 
You will pay only the cost for the selected decision. Hence the overall cost for distributed points cannot be 
higher than 10 tokens. Your cost is always 0 if you do not distribute points to anybody. 
 
Your overall period earnings are 
 
Period earnings =  phase one earnings – earning reduction     –  cost for distributed points 
                          =  phase one earnings – (received points)x4   – (actually distributed points)x4 
 
   Your final earnings are given by the sum of earnings in every period. Please notice that your period 
earnings can be negative. In that case they will be deducted from your cumulative earnings at the end of the 
experiment. 
   After everybody has completed his or her decision, you will learn phase two results. For each other 
person you will learn the earnings reduction due to point distributions. You will be informed about which 
one of your point distribution decisions was selected for implementation (asterisk in last row of the screen 
below).  To protect anonymity, you will not know who distributed the points. 
 
 
 In the input screen you can press the “Show previous decisions” button and you will see a table with your 
choices and the choices of the others in previous periods. 
   Please record period by period on paper the decision you input into the computer. 
 
Are there any questions? 
 
INSTRUCTIONS PART THREE 
 
   These are the instructions for the third and last part of the experiment. The third part consists of 10 
periods and, as before, in each period you have to make a decision about the use of 20 tokens. As before, 
each period is composed of two phases. Phase one is identical to the procedure already described while 
phase two has different rules. 
   Phase one instructions do not change and hence you can refer back to the previous text. Only phase two 
instructions will now be read. 
 
   In phase two of a period you can reduce or leave equal the earnings of each of the two persons that have 
benefited from the same project.  
   Your decision is about distributing points. Every point you distribute reduces the earnings of a person by 
4 (four) tokens. For the person who distributes it, every point has a cost of 1 token. You can distribute 
points separately to each of the other two people. If you do not wish to change the earnings of a specific 
person, you can choose 0. If you wish to reduce the earnings of a specific person, you can distribute to her a 
number of points from 0 through 10. You know only the decision made in phase one by the other people. 
There is no way for you to know either the identity or previous choices of the others. 
   For instance, if you distribute 2 points to a person and 3 points to another one, your overall cost is 5 
tokens (2+3). Instead, if you choose 0 points for a person, you do not change her earnings. If you distribute 
2 points to a person, you reduce her earnings by 8 tokens (2x4). The entirety of the earnings reduction 
depends on the sum of received points. If a person receives 2 points from somebody and 1 point from 
somebody else, her earnings are reduced by 12 tokens (((1+2)x4). 
 
   The distribution of points is carried out one person at a time in a sequence of two steps. 
Each period can be described as follow: 
 
                                 Phase one                                                Phase two 
 
 
                                                                                      Step one                 Step two 
                                                                                   (other person)      (other person) 
   
 
   In step one, you decide how many points to distribute to a specific person. You are the first to decide if 
and how many points to distribute to this person. After you, somebody else will have the opportunity to 
distribute points to the same person. 
   After you have chosen how many points to assign to this specific person, you are asked to make a 
forecast about how many points the person who will decide after you will distribute in step two to the same 
person (see outside the table, screen below). This forecast does not affect your earnings. 
  
 
In step two you decide how many points to distribute to the other person in addition to those already 
received. You will learn the points already received in step one from the one-before-the-last line of the 




   At the end of the two steps, every one of the persons that have benefited from the same project will have 
had the opportunity to distribute points to each one of the others. 
   Remember that the amount of earning reduction depends on the sum of the points received in the first and 
the second step. Your overall cost in tokens is equal to the sum of the points that you have distributed to others. That cost cannot be higher than 20 tokens.  (10 points times 2 people). Your cost is always 0 if you 
do not distribute points to anybody. 
 
  Your overall period earnings are 
Period earnings = phase one earnings – earning reduction     –  cost for distributed points 
                         =  phase one earnings – (sum of received points)x4   – (total points distributed)x4 
 
Please notice that your period earnings can be negative. In that case they will be deducted from your 
cumulative earnings at the end of the experiment. 
   After everybody has completed his or her decision, you will learn phase two results. For each other 
person you will learn the earning reduction due to point distributions.  
   After everybody has completed his or her decision, you will learn phase two results. For each other 
person you will learn the cumulative earning reduction due to point distributions. To protect anonymity, 
you will not know who distributed the points.  
In the input screen you can press the “Show previous decisions” button and you will see a table with your 
choices and the choices of the others in previous periods. 
   Please record period by period on paper the decision you input into the computer. 
 
Are there any questions? 
 